Abstract
Interface of earth exists between all electrical systems. This paper will review in more detail earthing of AC and DC railways, AC/DC interfaces, lightning and stray current corrosion.
Earthing of AC and DC railways 4, 10, 13 Electrical transportation systems (UK) by law are required to meet specifi c safety requirements: 
Earthing design objectives:
The earthing system, its components and bonding conductors should be capable of distributing and discharging the fault current without exceeding thermal and mechanical design limits based on back-up protection operating time.
The earthing system should maintain its integrity for the expected lifetime of the installation with due allowance for corrosion and mechanical constraints.
Earthing system performance should avoid damage to equipment due to excessive potential rise, potential differences within the earthing system and excessive currents fl owing in auxiliary paths not intended for carrying parts of the fault current.
The earthing system, in combination with appropriate measures, should maintain step, touch and transferred potentials within the voltage limits based on normal operating time of protection relays and breakers.
The earthing system performance should contribute to ensuring electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) among electrical and electronic apparatus of the low-voltage system in accordance with BS IEC 61000-5-2.
Integration is the term given to ensuring that the different elements of an electrifi ed railway operate together to achieve the desired result. This is particularly problematic where interfaces exist between the high power electrifi cation distribution or traction systems, and the low power signalling and communications control systems.
The challenge of integrating electrical systems will not be made any easier as client and public expectations of new rail transit systems require railway designers to incorporate more versatile and sophisticated electrifi cation systems.
Railway authorities in the past have found diffi culty in implementing a management strategy that will ensure electrifi ed railway systems are integrated. This is made more complex where the privatisation of railways and the procurement process divides contracts into separate engineering disciplines.
This paper seeks to explain the challenge of integrating the electrifi cation system with the sensitive signalling, communication control and low voltage systems. Additionally the paper will review the technical necessities of integrating the electrifi cation system with large civil structures. The paper will demonstrate how railway authorities are being challenged by the diffi cult task of integrating these system-wide disciplines.
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Surge arrestors: Gas plasma discharge arrestors have a fast response to transient overvoltage events. This fast response and the ability to handle very high current surges effectively suppresses transients. Low capacitance and high insulation resistance [ >Gohm] produce a low leakage ensuring that there is virtually no effect on the protected system.
Installation of surge arrestors:
Surge arrestors can be installed on telecommunications cables or on the installation equipment. Surge arrestors for commercial installations are rated at typically 250V. This is normally too low for the railway environment.
The surge arrestor operates when a voltage between the line and remote earth exceeds the level specifi ed. This method diverts the transient energy away from the line circuit and into the earth of the network. This is good as long as the earthed system is not coupled in any way with the telecommunications cables. The design of the earth should be such that there is no close parallel coupling with telecommunications cables.
Stray current corrosion control (DC railways)
The overall control strategy is to follow an approach that minimises the generation of stray current, controls its 'escape' and maintains separation between the rails and associated collection systems and the metro civil structures and external structures.
The driving force for stray current can be minimised by: Track circuit disturbance: DC traction return current fl owing in the AC traction rails can interfere with track circuits. Similarly the AC return current can interfere with track circuits used on DC electrifi ed lines.
DC stray current:
The bonds between the rails and metal structures etc. which are necessary for electrical safety in the presence of high-voltage AC railway overhead lines will provide a path for stray DC traction return current to fl ow to earth, and may cause electrolytic corrosion to the structures concerned, as well as neighbouring buried pipes, metal-sheathed cables etc.
Touch and accessible voltage:
The impedance of the rails at 50 Hz is much greater than the resistance of the rails at DC. This means that the return current from AC trains, and from shortcircuits on the AC overhead lines, would cause signifi cant voltage drops in the rails. This would bring a risk of electric shock if suitable means were not employed to limit the voltage on the rails.
Lightning protection 11, 12 Lightning and communications circuits.
Design approach on railways:
The protection of buildings, viaducts, bridges and structures from lightning is by the provision of lightning conductors and an earth electrode system. This earth is segregated from the earth path used by signalling control and the electrical and plant (E&P) systems.
In the case of the station roof structure and viaduct there is a requirement to provide lightning earthing, to control earth potentials.
Additionally there is a requirement to ensure the insulation co-ordination and any necessary segregation required for sensitive signalling and control systems that are located on or close to the station or viaduct.
Design approach on DC railways:
This strategy is designed to reduce corrosion threats to the rail infrastructure and to external infrastructure by minimising stray current leakage at source and retaining this as far as practicable within the rail system. Compatibility of electrical systems 3, 6, 8, 9 The EEC directive 89/336 made the requirement that all electrical apparatus must not emit electromagnetic radiation that would prevent other equipment from functioning as intended. The FI will usually consist of (6) equipment carrying the CE marking installed as specifi ed by the manufacturer(s) and specifi c equipment not otherwise commercially available can be incorporated, accompanied by documentation which indicates precautions to be taken for incorporation into the FI; the installation shall follow 'good engineering practice' which must be documented.
The railway environment: contains many sources of electromagnetic, electrostatic noise and electrical disturbances; and it is a hostile environment for low power circuits i.e. remote control systems, monitoring circuits, signalling systems, telecommunication circuits and radio networks. The complete railway electrifi cation network requires to be monitored in terms of emissions and susceptibility to electromagnetic interference, conductive interference and radio frequency interference. This includes electrical circuits in the supply of traction power, the control of traction power, the operation of signalling, train control circuits, the operation of telecommunication systems and radio communications.
Electromagnetic interference will largely cause interference from the high power circuits of the electrifi cation supply and traction drive into the train control systems, signalling systems and railway and publicly owned telecommunication systems, remote control, and monitoring systems.
The railway authority's responsibilities 15
The railway authority has a responsibility to ensure that projects include design specifi cations that address interfaces between electrical systems and also the management process, to ensure that systems do not adversely interact or disturb each other.
Application of railway and national standards BS EN standards are used extensively in the specifi cation of railway projects. The projects assume that if the standards are implemented then their design will always be adequate. The basic standard for earthing railways, EN 50122-1, is very clear on safety requirements for earthing and equipotential bonding. However, the standard is not a practical guide to earthing a railway. It is a performance specifi cation and details what is required to be undertaken by railway administration. It does not provide any detail on how installation should be undertaken.
It should also be noted that the European Standard EN50122-1 does not specifi cally address earthing arrangements for (1) lightning protection provide detail design and (2) interconnection of earthed systems system operability and the (3) design differences between rail return, auto feeding, booster return, single rail and double rail return systems.
Safety Management System 15
The Project Safety Management System (SMS) is part of the Quality Assurance process that is required to address safety of humans. In an electrifi ed railway the topics that need to be addressed include touch and accessible potential and the risks associated with the malfunction of signalling, and control systems leading to multiple fatalities.
All potential safety hazards associated with the operation of the railway including the earthed infrastructure of the railway network should be identifi ed. The hazards associated with electrifi cation supply points, overhead lines, traction return paths, operation of traction and rolling stock, effects in depots and station stops etc need to be addressed.
To achieve this, experts in the fi elds of electrifi cation, earthing, signalling and rolling stock are required to be brought together to assess the system behaviour under normal train operation, under system faults and all degraded modes of operation of the electrifi cation and signalling systems and the rolling stock.
Design interface specifi cations
Where there are known interfaces these should be recorded in an interface matrix and a specifi cation prepared between the two disciplines or contractors. Such interfaces could also include the co-location of several different railways at an interchange station.
An example of this is London, where various lines on the London Underground DC metro railway are in close proximity to the 25 kV AC main line infrastructure. The interface specifi cation should identify all of the systems that may be affected.
It is necessary that the responsibilities for the identifi ed hazards in the project are assigned an owner (and accepted) and that the designer then mitigates any potential disturbance. It should also be remembered that utilities and neighbours must be considered when addressing interface specifi cations within the railway environment. It has become the norm for railway contracts to be based along traditional engineering disciplines and interfaces; for example, wheel to rail and pantograph interfaces. Railway authorities sometimes fail to recognise the complexity of electrical interfaces and provide a solution to manage the integration between different engineering disciplines.
The major cost element of a new railway is the civils discipline; the electrical systems are a relatively small portion when compared to the civil infrastructure costs. However, failure to integrate the electrical systems will probably mean disruption to the whole project during commissioning and delay early operational service.
Major Rail Projects are largely run by the Civil Engineering Discipline. Rail Authorities often fail to provide adequate project management effort to integrate the systems, placing the whole project programme at risk.
Specify design interface specifi cation
The railway administration should be aware of the requirements for integration, and it is their responsibility to identify and include these criteria within the project requirements at the defi nition stage.
Interface requirements must then be included within the Particular Design Specifi cations for each contract.
They should also make all System Wide Contractors responsible for identifying interfaces, hazards and for participating in the integration methodology of the project.
If they fail to include this within the particular specifi cation, then the contractors will not be obliged to ensure that this integration happens. The outcome of this can be disastrous for the project programme and the railway administration, which may be powerless to ensure that their multi-million pound investment operates as intended.
Management of electrical systems
The railway authority should specify the requirement for Management Plans to address quality assurance process and installation Codes of Practice. This is to ensure compliance with railway and national electrical and safety standards. This normally becomes the responsibility of the design and build contractor and has been addressed in more detail later in this article.
Design management responsibilities
The preliminary and detailed design stages of project management plans should be prepared to address the above system interfaces. The following are examples of management plans that should be incorporated within the overall systems engineering management plan.
This is normally the responsibility of the Design and Build Contractors.
Integration Management Plan 6
The Electrical System Integration Management Plan should set out a strategy to ensure correct operation of equipment for the project life-cycle to ensure that systems are integrated successfully.
The following disciplines and systems should be included: traction power and electrifi cation (both rail authority and public supply), signalling and control, telecommunications, rail vehicles, permanent-way and civils infrastructure, and third parties.
Failure to integrate these electrical systems properly will introduce the probability of an electrical or control system failure. This could then have a subsequent disturbance to the operation of the railway.
Earthing Management Plan 4
The content and detail should be based on previous experience of earthing other AC/DC railways and the performance requirements of relevant national and international standards i.e. European Standard EN50122-1, and British Standards BS7671 and BS7430.
It should set out a strategy which ensures the management of interconnection of earths, including: railway electrifi cation and distribution systems, the distribution network operator, the low voltage (LV) distribution earths, signalling earths, lightning conduction and other inter-system earths.
The requirements of utility companies' earthing practices and their connection to the railway need to be recognised and integrated.
An Earthing Management Plan should include a 'process' to cover requirements at design, installation and operational stages of the railway.
Electromagnetic Compatibility Management Plan 3, 6 An EMC Management Plan is required and should be based on the requirements of EN50121, EN61000-5 and EN61000-6. It should set out a strategy for the project to ensure EMC is achieved. It should identify a quality assurance process including hazard identifi cation, required deliverables, roles and responsibilities, EMC certifi cation and test specifi cations. The 'stray current management plan' should provide guidance on the management framework, quality processes and deliverables that are required through the design and installation stages of a project. Specifi cally this plan should detail acceptable pass/fail criteria for the level of stray current, after construction is completed.
This plan should detail deliverables including the 'stray current code of practice', test plans and monitoring plans. The Code of Practice should provide detail of the design, based on known proven technologies and evidence of best practice e.g. attention to electrical substation connection, high rail insulation, good stray current collection, good drainage construction supervision and quality control by qualifi ed personnel, and the necessary testing and monitoring system.
Concluding remarks
New railway projects and the privatisation of railways have divided contracts and the design process into separate engineering disciplines. Railway authorities need to recognise the importance of integrating the electrical systems. Failure to do so will have a subsequent consequence on delivering a railway free from electrical disturbances.
This paper has endeavoured to demonstrate how railway authorities are being challenged by this diffi cult task of integrating electrical systems. This challenge will not be made any easier as client and public expectations of new rail transit systems require the railway designers to incorporate more versatile and sophisticated electrifi ed railway and tram networks.
